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PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS FOR THE
GLOBAL COMMONS: BOTTOM-UP OR
TOP-DOWN?
TERRY L. ANDERSON* AND J. BISHOP GREWELL**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Environmental concerns often ignore geo-political borders.
Problems that previously were dealt with by one nation and its gov-
ernment now involve scores of nations and their governments.  At
one time, policymakers focused predominantly on local matters,
where pollutants might simply cross the boundary of two neighbors’
backyards, or interstate problems, such as air and water pollution that
could be handled within a nation or two.  Now, however, policymak-
ers are faced with international problems, such as the extinction of
species, and global problems, such as ozone depletion and global
warming.
Local environmental concerns are best understood and resolved
in a framework initially developed by Nobel laureate Ronald H.
Coase, wherein these concerns are viewed as a competition over con-
flicting uses for scarce resources.1  In this context, air pollution by a
factory is simply a use of air that conflicts with others’ enjoyment of
that resource.  So, the question then becomes: which user has a right
to the air?2  Conflicting uses, such as in the air pollution example, can
be resolved through bargaining if well-defined property rights specify
who has the right to use the resources and therein derive value from
them.3
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1. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 15 (1960).
2. See id. at 15 (“[I]t has to be remembered that the immediate question . . . is not what
shall be done by whom but who has the legal right to do what.”).
3. See id.
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The main question this article addresses is whether the Coasean
property rights solution to environmental problems can be used as ef-
fectively on the international level as it has been used on the local
level.  Specifically, the authors pose the following two questions: (1)
can effective property rights be created under international law, and
(2) can and should such property rights be created top-down instead
of bottom-up?  In this article, “top-down” means government-
mandated property rights, and “bottom-up” means customary, com-
mon law property rights that are formed over time when conflicts
over resource use arise.
In addressing these questions, this article first contrasts the
Coasean view of conflicting resource use with the Pigouvian view of
externalities.  It then considers the importance of time- and place-
specific information in the evolution of property rights to determine
how they are established.  Then, the article contrasts bottom-up
property rights with the prospect of developing effective top-down
property rights and provides examples of both.  Acknowledging that
transaction costs may thwart privatization of the global commons
(e.g., the global atmosphere), it then addresses the limits of top-down
solutions and offers policy suggestions that build on property rights
and the rule of law.
II.  TWO VIEWS OF THE COMMONS: PIGOU VS. COASE
Following A. C. Pigou,4 the dominant policy approach for solving
environmental problems has been to use government’s power to tax
and regulate.5  Government intervention is seen as justified when ex-
ternalities exist.  The term “externality” refers to an economic con-
cept asserting that inefficiencies result when costs incurred and bene-
fits received by individuals involved in an economic transaction or
activity do not incorporate all the costs and benefits to society.6
Therefore, a transaction that seems efficient to the individual parties
to a transaction may really be inefficient from the viewpoint of society
4. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (AMS Press 1978) (4th ed. 1932):
5. See Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou, and Environmental Rights, in WHO OWNS THE
ENVIRONMENT? 119, 127 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) [hereinafter Yandle,
Coase and Pigou].
6. See Terry L. Anderson, Bucking the Tide of Globalism: The Free Market Alternative, in
THE GREENING OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Terry L. Anderson & Henry I. Miller eds., forth-
coming 2000) [hereinafter GREENING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY].  A classic externality example is
planting a flower garden.  The property owner who plants flowers benefits from their aesthetic
beauty, but so does his neighbors; yet, the neighbors bear none of the costs associated with
planting or maintaining the flowers and still receive their benefits.
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because of the existence of externalities.7  Negative externalities are
present when a portion of the costs of an economic transaction are
imposed on others outside of that transaction without their consent.
According to this reasoning, negative externalities result in over-
production or over-use of resources, because resource users do not
bear the full costs associated with their activities.8  This problem can
turn into a “tragedy of the commons” when every user of a commons
receives the full marginal benefit from their use, but bears only a por-
tion of the marginal cost.9
Coase, however, offered a different approach to the problem of
social cost.10  Coase did not think in terms of externalities, but rather
considered pollution and clean air (or water, forests, wildlife habitat)
as conflicting or alternative resource uses for which there is competi-
tion.11  According to Bruce Yandle,
This approach considers the paper mill and others who wish to con-
sume or enjoy water quality as a part of a competitive market
where people bargain for the use of the rights to scarce property.
7. An externality is negative when its costs are imposed on those other than the owner
and positive when it results in benefits for those other than the owner.  The flower garden ex-
ample mentioned in the note above results in a positive externality.  Noise from a factory that
drifts onto neighboring properties, creating a nuisance, is an example of a negative externality.
In this example, the factory receives the full benefit of its production process (and its attendant
noise) in the form of whatever it is selling, but bears only part of the costs, as the community
bears part of the noise costs associated with its production process.
8. Positive externalities result in under-production as others receive benefits without
paying for them—the free rider problem. See supra text accompanying note 7 for further expla-
nation.
9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
10. See Coase, supra note 1, at 42-43.
11. See id. at 15.  Coase entitled his paper The Problem of Social Cost because he disagreed
with the Pigouvian formulation of the problem in terms of “externality,” or the divergence be-
tween private and social costs. See id. at 42-43.  Pigou did not actually use the term “external-
ity;” however, the concept of externality can be traced back to Pigou’s analysis of the diver-
gences between social and private net product. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a
Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970); see also
PIGOU, supra note 4, at 174:
The source of the general divergences between the values of marginal social and mar-
ginal private net product that occur under simple competition is the fact that, in some
occupations, a part of the product of a unit of resources consists of something, which,
instead of coming in the first instance to the person who invests the unit, comes in-
stead, in the first instance . . . as a positive or negative item[ ] to other people.
For other works criticizing the concept of externality, see Cheung, supra, at 70 (“The concept of
‘externality’ is vague because every economic action has effects; it is confusing because classifi-
cations and theories are varied, arbitrary, and ad hoc.  For these reasons, theories generated by
the concept of ‘externality’ are not likely to be useful.”); Richard Stroup & John Baden, Exter-
nality, Property Rights, and the Management of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & ECON. 313, 307
n.8 (1973) (finding Cheung’s suggestion—that the term “externality” is so broad as to be use-
less—to be “a cogent and productive perspective”).
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This analysis has nothing to do with polluters’ imposing costs on so-
ciety, but everything to do with competing demands for use of an
asset.12
The focus on competing uses rather than on social costs necessitates
resolving an important question: who has the property rights to a
scarce resource?  While free trade and competition for resource use
resolves which use is valued higher, the issue of who actually owns the
property right to a scarce resource must be resolved.  Thus, the
Coasean perspective defines environmental problems not in terms of
externalities, but rather as problems brought about by ill-defined
property rights.13
In order for a system of bargaining to resolve conflicting resource
uses, property rights to the resource in question must be defined, di-
vestible, and defensible.14  Given such property rights, two parties
with an interest in the same resource may voluntarily negotiate for its
use, and the party who values the use highest will offer the greatest
compensation to the owner, thereby winning the right to use the re-
source.15  This institutional framework of competitive resource use
and property rights has fostered the resolution of environmental
problems at the local and national level for centuries.16
As Coase recognized, however, establishing property rights, bar-
gaining over them, and enforcing them have associated transaction
costs.17  The definition and enforcement of property rights requires
12. Yandle, Coase and Pigou, supra note 5, at 120.
13. See Coase, supra note 1, at 19.
14. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
20 (1991) [hereinafter ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM]; Bruce Yan-
dle, Grasping for the Heavens: 3-D Property Rights and the Global Commons, 10 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 13, 14 & n.3 (1999) (referring to property rights that have these three conditions
as “3-D property rights”) [hereinafter Yandle, Grasping for the Heavens].
15. See Coase, supra note 1, at 2-8.
16. For examples of property rights working on these levels, such as water marketing, fee
hunting, pollution control and others, see ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14; TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-
CAPITALISTS: DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL (1997); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE
AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD
ECONOMIES (1997) [hereinafter YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW].
17. See Coase, supra note 1, at 15:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and
so on.  These operations are often quite costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent
many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system
worked without cost.
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investments on the part of would-be owners.18  Once rights are estab-
lished, bargaining over resource use can also be costly, especially if
the value of a particular use comes from an aggregation of individual
users’ rights.  If definition and enforcement and/or bargaining are too
costly, then it may be difficult or impossible for the Coasean system
to resolve the conflicting uses.19  Hence, two questions must be an-
swered: (1) how are the initial property rights established, and (2)
once established, what are the transaction costs of bargaining over,
enforcing, and transferring property rights?
III.  CREATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM THE BOTTOM-UP OR
THE TOP-DOWN?
Property rights may evolve from the bottom-up as individuals
competing for resource uses assert their claims to be free of other
competing uses.20  Harold Demsetz notes that whether res nullius
(open access) or private property governs resource use depends on
the level of benefits expected from the property and the costs of
monitoring and enforcing the property right by excluding others.21
When resources become scarcer or the costs of definition and en-
forcement decline, the possibility that property rights will be asserted
and defended increases.  Consider the example offered by Richard
Posner of a primitive society whose principal use of land is grazing
and whose numbers are relatively small compared to the amount of
land.22  If there is plenty of unimproved grazing land to go around, in
other words, if there are not competing uses, the costs of enforcing
property rights are substantial relative to the benefits, and there is no
call for property rights.23  However, as population growth creates
competing uses, the land resource becomes valuable and competition
for use increases.  Pressure builds to define and enforce property
rights and to find lower cost methods of doing so.  In essence, the
production of property rights responds to the economic calculus of
18. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165-67 (1975) [hereinafter Anderson & Hill, Evolution of
Property Rights].
19. See Coase, supra note 1, at 16.
20. See Anderson & Hill, Evolution of Property Rights, supra note 18, at 164-68.
21. See Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 11, 20 (1964).
22. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39 (5th ed. 1998).
23. See id.
ANDERSON_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:54 AM
78 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:73
marginal benefits and marginal costs.24  Once the benefits of property
rights outweigh the costs of definition and enforcement, a property
system develops.25
Yet, property need not be claimed solely by individuals.  Often,
as Elinor Ostrom illustrates, community property rights arise to re-
solve conflicting uses.26  In Governing the Commons, Ostrom defines a
common pool resource as “a natural or man-made resource system
that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.”27
Problems that arise from a common pool resource are similar to those
that arise from the free rider problem.28  Ostrom notes that “[w]hen
appropriators act independently in relationship to a [common pool
resource] generating scarce resource units, the total net benefits they
obtain usually will be less than could have been achieved if they had
coordinated their strategies in some way.”29  In order to combat these
problems, common property often arises.30  As Margaret McKean and
Ostrom put it, this “common property is shared private property”
that gives all of the individual owners a claim in the whole resource
and thus instills them with proper incentives to protect the resource.31
Whether property rights evolve as private or as shared common
property, definition and enforcement costs are likely to be lower at
the local level because those involved in the process have more incen-
tive and greater ability to economize on expenditures.32  There are a
24. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
25. Numerous texts cite the development of property through technologies both improving
the value of property and lowering the cost of enforcing it. See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, Evolution
of Property Rights, supra note 18.  For instance, the invention of barbwire and the development
of branding techniques lowered costs of enforcing and demarcating property in the Old West.
See id. at 172.  The benefits of devoting resources to defining and enforcing property rights also
grew as more people crowded into the Old West, making good land scarce relative to the num-
ber of people, which increased its value. See id.
26. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 20-21 (1990).
27. Id. at 30.  Fisheries are a classic example of a common pool resource. See, e.g., H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON.
124 (1954).
28. See OSTROM, supra note 26, at 32-33.  See supra text accompanying note 8.
29. See id. at 38.
30. See id. at 18-21.
31. M. McKean & E. Ostrom, Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic From
the Past?, UNASYLVA, 1995/1, at 3, 6.
32. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50
S. ECON J. 438, 441 (1983) [hereinafter Anderson & Hill, Privatizing the Commons]:
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number of reasons to expect this.  Individuals at the local level are
likely to be more culturally homogeneous, and that homogeneity pro-
vides norms that can help resolve conflicts in closely knit groups.33
Such social and cultural norms develop over time as efficiency-
enhancing norms replace efficiency-reducing ones and as those who
disagree with norms move where the norms better fit their prefer-
ences.34  Cultural homogeneity also reduces transaction costs through
common language that can lower the costs of specifying property
rights and negotiating over their use.35
Adjudication procedures are also likely to be less costly in a cul-
turally homogeneous group.  Cultural norms specify right and wrong
behavior and provide low-cost ways of resolving disputes.  As indi-
viduals within a group confront similar conflicts over property rights,
tradition becomes a way of economizing on adjudication costs.
Hence, the common law evolves by categorizing similarities between
different conflicts and using those similarities to create property and
liability rules.
Moreover, homogeneous interdependent technologies can lower
the costs of defining and enforcing property rights.  Economies of
scale in a production process can provide members of a community
with a reason (in addition to avoiding the tragedy of the commons) to
cooperate and can provide a mechanism for excluding others.36  For
example, Indians in the Southwest built elaborate irrigation systems
that benefited from economies of scale in construction.37  They coop-
erated in building dams to check the water and ditches to deliver it to
fields but cultivated their fields as private property.38
[T]wo individuals faced with the problem of defining rights to an unclaimed acre of
land . . . have an incentive to establish ownership in the cheapest manner, since they
bear the cost of the resources consumed in the property rights production . . . .
As long as those bargaining for the property rights are free to choose their own defini-
tion process, there is an incentive to reduce definition costs since they are residual
claimants.
33. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 177-82 (1991).
34. See TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 7 (1995) [hereinafter ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR
RESERVATIONS?].
35. See Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of
Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39, 49 (1994) (discussing the impact of language differ-
ences on Indian-white relations in the nineteenth century).
36. Economies of scale occur when increases in the quantity of a good lead to increased
savings per good produced. These tend to occur when there are large fixed costs to a project.
37. See ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS?, supra note 34, at 33-34.
38. See id. at 34.
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To illustrate how these characteristics of bottom-up or local
evolution of property rights can conserve on definition and enforce-
ment costs, consider cattlemen’s associations in the American West.
Cattlemen arriving on the Montana and Wyoming plains first found
no conflicts over resource use.39  If a range was occupied, a cattleman
simply moved to a new location where grass was abundant and cows
were few.40  “There was room enough for all, and when a cattleman
rode up some likely valley or across some well-grassed divide and
found cattle thereon, he looked elsewhere for range.”41  But as more
and more cattle arrived, the potential for overgrazing the commons
became a real possibility, especially without low-cost materials for
fencing.
To prevent the tragedy of the commons, cattlemen announced
customary range rights and declared the range closed.  An 1883 notice
in a Helena, Montana paper was typical:
We the undersigned, stock growers of the above described range,
hereby give notice that we consider said range already overstocked;
therefore we positively decline allowing any outside parties or any
parties locating herds upon this range the use of our corrals, nor
will they be permitted to join us in any roundup on said range from
and after this date.42
The associations enforced their customary range rights with two
mechanisms.  First, line camps were established on the boundaries of
the customary range.43  From these camps, cowboys rode along the
boundaries keeping the cattle on their respective sides of the bound-
ary line and watching for trespassers and rustlers.44  Second, the cat-
tlemen formed cattlemen’s associations that recorded the customary
range descriptions and coordinated collective roundups twice each
year.45  Detailed local rules were established regarding the organiza-
tion of the roundup and the areas that it would cover.  For example,
39. See ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE CATTLEMAN 182 (1929).
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. R. Taylor Dennen, Cattlemen’s Associations and Property Rights in Land in the Ameri-
can West, 13 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 423, 427 (1976) (quoting a notice published in the
Helena, Montana, Daily Herald of Sept. 3, 1883); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE
RANGE: FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND GRAZING 18 (1981) (quoting same passage);
OSGOOD, supra note 39, at 185-86 (quoting a similar notice declaring the range closed, appear-
ing in the Rocky Mountain Husbandman, July 19, 1883).
43. See ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 31
(describing the use of such “human fences”).
44. See id.
45. See Dennen, supra note 42, at 426-27; MICHAEL P. MALONE & RICHARD B. ROEDER,
MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 120 (1976).
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an 1884 roundup in the North Dakota territory published its rules in a
local paper.46
The cattlemen are all supposed to know that the roundup for this
section of the Bad Lands begins May 25, at the Beaver Creek
crossing of the N.P.R.R.  Every stock owner will send enough cow-
boys to look after his interests, who will be under orders of and
subject to dismissal by the foreman, John Goodall.  Each cattle
owner will provide a mess-wagon or make arrangements with
someone else.  At least six good horses will be needed by every
man.  There will be day and night herding, in which each man must
take a part.  Branding will be done every day.  Every man who
wishes his cattle taken care of, must be represented on the
roundup.  The time taken by the roundup will be six weeks to two
months and the extent of the territory is about one hundred by fifty
miles.  In this district there are about 40,000 cattle.47
These roundups were a necessary part of the production process,
with the spring roundup used to brand new calves and the fall
roundup used to collect and drive cows to market.48  With cattle scat-
tered over very large areas, roundups required a large number of
cowboys, more than any single cattle operation had.49  By cooperating
in roundups, cattlemen could capture scale economies.50  Thus, there
were substantial savings realized by the cattlemen in forming a com-
mon, coordinated roundup.51
As the notice in the Helena, Montana, newspaper exemplifies,
however, the ability to exclude newcomers from a roundup was also a
crucial mechanism for blocking entry to the range.52  By excluding
outsiders from the roundup, association members could exclude them
from the range itself; because, without the roundup, grazing on the
open range was economically unfeasible.  Michael Malone and Rich-
ard Roeder provide the following example:
In 1885, for instance, John H. Conrad, a Fort Benton[, Montana,]
area rancher, moved six thousand cattle onto rangeland east of the
Musselshell River which was claimed by the Niobrara Cattle Com-
pany.  A fall meeting of Miles City stockmen condemned Conrad
for this violation of range law and warned him that they would not
handle his stock or cooperate with him in any way.  He got the mes-
46. See MARK H. BROWN & W.R. FELTON, BEFORE BARBED WIRE 173 (1956).
47. Id. (quoting a notice appearing in Medora’s paper, The Cow Boy, on May 15, 1884).
48. See MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 45, at 120.
49. See id.
50. See Dennen, supra note 42, at 427.
51. See id. at 427-28.
52. See id. at 427.
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sage and withdrew his herd . . . .53
The cattle company’s effectiveness at limiting entry and therefore
protecting their share of the range resources is evident in the fact that
when a ranch was sold, the purchaser obtained the customary range
rights that represented the exclusive privilege to graze on the open
range.54  R. Taylor Dennen lists several observations of range rights
that were valuable in the market place.55  He calculates the range
rights in two purchases made by one cattle company in 1884 as “val-
ued at something over $200,000.”56  Another company carried on its
book a valuation of $85,000 for the range rights that it owned.57
Such customs—line camps and cattlemen’s associations—were
effective for defining and enforcing property rights as long as the
community was homogeneous and bound together by its collective
production function—the roundup.  This system broke down, how-
ever, when sheepherders began competing for use of the range.58
With sheep controlled on the open range by herders, there was no
need to rely on neighbors for a roundup.59  Thus, roundups lost their
effectiveness as an exclusion mechanism, and range wars sometimes
resulted.60
The breakdown of customary range rules enforced by cattle-
men’s associations illustrates one of the problems of developing
property rights from the bottom-up—enforcement.  For property
rights to be effective in resolving competing uses, they must be en-
forced against outsiders.  Local, customary enforcement mechanisms,
however, may have difficulties excluding outsiders because exclusion
ultimately requires a comparative advantage in the use of force.  If
53. MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 45, at 124.




58. See OSGOOD, supra note 39, at 189; DAN FULTON, FAILURE ON THE PLAINS: A
RANCHER’S VIEW OF THE PUBLIC LANDS PROBLEM 42-43 (1982):
[A] considerable part of Western folklore revolves around sheep.  The idea that cattle
can’t graze on the same ranch with sheep is known to almost everyone.  It is also com-
pletely untrue.  If they belong to the same owner or, as the saying used to be, “they
wear the same brand,” they get along very well.
The problem came when a “floating” sheepman brought his sheep into an area already
the “accustomed range” of someone else, whether a cattleman or another sheepman.
The classic case in Montana was in the Tongue River Country, December 28, 1900.  An
entire band of sheep was beaten to death with clubs.
59. See OSGOOD, supra note 39, at 189 (“Against the sheep herder, fences and force were
the only successful protective measures.”)
60. See id. at 189, 247-54; FULTON, supra note 58, at 43 (describing  and providing examples
of cattlemen-sheepmen wars).
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would-be entrants question that comparative advantage, conflict will
result.
The issue is, thus, one of sovereignty, where sovereignty deter-
mines the ultimate authority to exclude others.  The cattlemen’s asso-
ciations were sovereign with respect to the customary grazing rights
until homesteaders and sheepherders challenged that sovereignty.
The latter won the challenge by turning to the national sovereign with
its power to force cattlemen off their customary ranges.61
In this sense, bottom-up property rights begin to blur with top-
down property rights because both depend on having the coercive
power to exclude.  The difference between the two is a matter of de-
gree, which depends on the number of people encompassed in the
sovereign group.  Accordingly, property rights determined by cattle-
men’s associations evolved from the bottom-up relative to the top-
down homestead acts legislated by the Congress of the United States.
If bottom-up evolution of property rights conserves on resources
in definition and enforcement, then why are top-down property rights
ever observed?  At least two possible reasons may account for the
existence of top-down property rights.  First, because transaction
costs may preclude agreement among individuals or between com-
peting groups (e.g., cattlemen and sheepherders), a larger sovereign
(e.g., state or national government) with coercive power over com-
peting resource users may be necessary to resolve conflicts.62  In other
words, where transaction costs are prohibitive for bottom-up agree-
ment, top-down rules may be the only way of minimizing costs.
Range wars, though few, did arise with their attendant dead weight
losses.  Calling on a sovereign with superior coercive power may pro-
vide a way of conserving on these dead weight losses.  In other words,
where transaction costs are prohibitive for bottom-up agreement, top-
down rules may reduce losses from conflict.
Second, the existence of top-down property rights may be ex-
plained by the efforts of parties excluded by local sovereigns to use
higher levels of government to redistribute locally defined and en-
forced rights.  For example, by inducing the national government to
61. See LIBECAP, supra note 42, at 31-32.
62. See David D. Haddock, Must Water Regulation be Centralized?, in WATER
MARKETING—THE NEXT GENERATION 43, 45 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997)
[hereinafter WATER MARKETING] (“[T]ransaction costs offer a motivation for regulatory cen-
tralization.  Because far-flung boundaries for a governing body are more likely to contain exter-
nalities fully, centralized regulation confers benefits.”).  Coercive power refers to the ability of a
government to send in deadly force to enforce a law.
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redistribute customary rights, competing users of a resource can ob-
tain the rents therefrom without paying for them, as they would
through negotiations.63  This process, known to economists as “rent
seeking,” was exemplified by homesteaders and sheepmen employing
the national government to take away the customary range rights
from cattlemen rather than directly bargaining with the cattlemen for
them.64  Examples of this type of rent seeking emanate from the In-
dian Wars of the last half of the nineteenth century when the U.S.
military took away Indian land for settlement by whites.65  In a mod-
ern global context, the Kyoto accord can be interpreted as rent seek-
ing.66  In the discussion of Kyoto below, rent-seeking costs that arise
with top-down property rights must be balanced against the transac-
tion costs of bottom-up evolution.
IV.  PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE GLOBAL
CONFLICTS
The problems with bottom-up evolution of property rights and
the contrasting explanations for top-down property rights are espe-
cially evident in the global environmental commons.  When conflict-
ing resource uses involve individuals or groups on opposite sides of
political borders or across non-adjoining borders, there is less possi-
bility for cultural homogeneity, increased communication difficulties,
and less-developed adjudication procedures.  There is, therefore, less
possibility for norms to lower the transaction costs of defining and en-
forcing property rights at the local level.  To make matters worse,
competing sovereigns may be willing to exert their power over a re-
source and challenge other sovereigns to counter that power.  Sover-
63. See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988) (providing several perspectives on the workings of the political marketplace and the crea-
tion and destruction of rents via voting, regulation, aid, etc.).
64. See LIBECAP, supra note 42, at 31-36.
65. See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 35, at 57-58, 61-64.
66. See BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, BAPTISTS AND GLOBAL WARMING 7-13 (Pol.
Econ. Res. Ctr., PERC Pol’y Series PS-14, 1998) [hereinafter YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS].  The
Kyoto Protocol is the result of a conference on climate change held in Kyoto, Japan in Decem-
ber of 1997. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (not yet in force) (84 signatories and
22 Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at <http://www.unfccc.de/
resource/docs/cop3/l07a01.htm>.  It calls for a reduction in so-called “greenhouse gases” by the
countries of the world.
Rent seeking refers to activities to earn a profit in excess of those that would be earned in
an unhindered competitive market.  Thus, it refers to attempting to gain profits through gov-
ernment interference with the market.
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eign nations also may be unwilling to let their subjects bargain across
borders to resolve conflicting resource uses.  For example, Canada re-
sisted including water trading in the North American Free Trade
Agreement, even where individuals had clearly specified property
rights and could find willing buyer-willing seller exchanges.67
This is not to say that bottom-up property rights cannot work in
the context of global resources, but that transaction costs are more
likely to preclude bargaining solutions.  However, international
agreements can help reduce transaction costs by recognizing local
property rights and establishing tribunals for adjudicating conflicts
across boundaries.68  Julian Morris cites one such case where an inter-
national tribunal adjudicated conflict over transboundary pollution.69
In the Trail Smelter case,70 a smelter operated by Cominco in British
Columbia, Canada, had been operating since the 1920s, emitting
fumes which were harming cattle ranchers in the United States.71
Rather than sue Cominco directly, the ranchers petitioned the U.S.
government, which, in conjunction with the Canadian government,
appointed the International Joint Commission (IJC) as a special tri-
bunal.72  The IJC awarded the ranchers damages, but the harm con-
tinued so the U.S. rejected the award on behalf of the ranchers.73
Canada and the U.S. then set up a special arbitration including a
judge from each country and one from Belgium.74  The arbiters’ deci-
sion awarded more substantial damages and granted an injunction
against further emissions.75  As Morris writes, the arbiters in Trail
Smelter reasoned that
under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
67. See Jon R. Johnson, Canadian Water and Free Trade, in CONTINENTAL WATER
MARKETING 55, 67 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1994).
68. See Julian Morris, International Environmental Agreements: Developing Another Path,
in GREENING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 6 (manuscript at 205, 210-11, on file with
authors).
69. See id. (manuscript at 211).
70. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949).
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case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence.76
In this case, the adjudicating international body recognized the local
property rights of the U.S. ranchers.77
For property rights solutions to figure into international law, the
two questions asked at the beginning of this article must be answered
regarding the applicability of property rights: (1) can effective prop-
erty rights be created under international law, and (2) can and should
such property rights be created top-down instead of bottom-up?
A.  Bottom-Up Prospects
The first question was answered with the Trail Smelter case men-
tioned above.  This case illustrates how cultural homogeneity and in-
ternational law can help create and recognize effective property
rights.  The Trail Smelter case relied on adjudication by an interna-
tional body agreed upon by two countries that share the British tradi-
tion of property rights and common law.  This common tradition cer-
tainly lowered the costs of agreeing on an adjudication mechanism
and facilitated recognition of the ranchers’ right to use air free from
pollutants.  Nonetheless, the case took several years to adjudicate and
was costly enough that such actions for resolving conflicting resource
uses may be discouraged.  It stands to reason, however, that if more
Trail Smelter-type cases were brought forward, the adjudication proc-
ess would become more common, costs would go down, and trials
would be quicker as precedent is set.  Treaties, which facilitate the
ability of individuals such as the ranchers in Trail Smelter to bring suit
against international counterparts such as the Cominco Smelter,
could lower the costs of enforcing and recognizing international
property rights.  In summary, Trail Smelter shows that local property
rights that evolve bottom-up can be recognized and enforced from the
top-down.
The number of such examples in international law is small, sug-
gesting that transaction costs make bottom-up evolution more diffi-
76. Id. (quoting Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965).
77. See id.  Trail Smelter analysis recognizes that the transaction costs of protecting prop-
erty rights in the way of the Trail Smelter case may be prohibitive. See id. (manuscript at 211
n.12).  In a footnote, Morris cites four reasons transaction costs associated with Trail Smelter-
type solutions may be prohibitive: (1) it is costly to organize a petition; (2) the petition may not
motivate the government to take action; (3) the government action may not be successful in the
end; and (4) it may take considerable time to achieve any success. See id.  The fourth reason was
particularly evident in the Trail Smelter case itself, because the arbitration was not resolved until
sixteen years after the ranchers’ initial petition. See id.
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cult for the global commons.  An abundance of interstate examples,
however, illustrates what it takes to make bottom-up evolution more
efficacious.78  Common law in the United States, especially prior to
the recent growth of national regulations, is filled with cases where
plaintiffs in one state have brought actions against polluters in an-
other and have prevailed.79  For example, in Carmichael v. City of
Texarkana the city of Texarkana, Arkansas, built a sewage system in
the 1890s, depositing the collected sewage opposite a homestead
owned by the Carmichael family, living in Texas.80  The sewage outlet
was eight feet inside the Arkansas state-line, while the Carmichael
residence was on the other side in Texas.81  Because the sewage made
the private water supply unsafe, the family was forced to connect
their property to a public water system to obtain water at a cost of
$700.82  In addition, they claimed their property value was reduced by
$5,000, their enjoyment of their property had been reduced by $2,000
over a two-year period, and fear of disease harmed them another
$2,000.83  They sued the city of Texarkana in federal court for the sum
of these costs, as well as for a permanent injunction against the cess-
pool.84  The federal court rewarded the Carmichael family victory on
all claims against the City of Texarkana.85
In order for such common law actions to be effective in creating
a legal environment in which bottom-up property rights can evolve,
the same ingredients that made Trail Smelter work are necessary—
namely, that sovereign states agree that they will recognize and abide
by binding decisions from a higher tribunal.  In this setting, harmed
parties can take action against polluters in other jurisdictions, and
courts can decide who has what rights.  In the Trail Smelter case, the
specially created international tribunal performed this function estab-
lishing a model for how international agreements might help facilitate
bottom-up evolution of property rights.  Of course, it must again be
stressed that the possibility of this type of evolution is made easier by
78. See, e.g., YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 16, at 87-117, 143-
66.
79. See id.; ROGER E. MEINERS & BRUCE YANDLE, THE COMMON LAW: HOW IT
PROTECTS THE ENVIRONMENT 3-23 (Pol. Econ. Res. Ctr., PERC Pol’y Series PS-13, 1998).
80. See Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, 94 F. 561 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1899). See also
MEINERS & YANDLE, supra note 79, at 4-6 (discussing the Carmichael case).
81. See Carmichael, 94 F. at 562.
82. See id. at 562-63.
83. See id. at 563.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 575.
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the homogeneity of the state legal systems within the United States
and between the United States and Canada.  Similar examples can be
expected to evolve within the European Union.  The lesson for solv-
ing global disputes in this way is to create an institutional environ-
ment in which sovereign nations agree to bind their citizens to the de-
cisions of higher tribunals.
B.  Top-Down Prospects
Because extending this model across less homogeneous borders
involving many more countries is more problematic, the following
question must be answered: can international property rights be cre-
ated top-down when the transaction costs of establishing bottom-up
property rights are prohibitive?  For resources that have traditionally
been open-access, developing bottom-up property rights that exclude
or restrict traditional users may be cost-prohibitive.  Examples of na-
tionally created property rights can help illustrate how international
property rights might be created.  The authors consider four exam-
ples: (1) ITQs in New Zealand fisheries, (2) water pollution rights in
the Tar-Pamlico Basin of North Carolina, (3) air pollution rights in
the Los Angeles Basin of California, and (4) rights to wildlife under
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program.
1.  ITQs
Community-run fisheries illustrate that transaction costs are not
always prohibitive for ocean resources where local groups can moni-
tor access.86  Donald Leal cites the success of numerous fisheries
where agreements and social customs between the fishermen have
prevented overharvesting.87  Leal’s work also notes cases where gov-
ernment intervention ruined these bottom-up solutions.88
For fisheries where transaction costs have thwarted property
rights solutions, however, top-down property rights have limited ac-
cess and improved harvest mainly through individual tradable quotas
(ITQs).89  These quotas guarantee each fisherman a certain share of
86. See DONALD R. LEAL, COMMUNITY-RUN FISHERIES: AVOIDING THE ‘TRAGEDY OF
THE COMMONS’ 2-3 (Pol. Econ. Res. Ctr., PERC Pol’y Series PS-7, 1996).
87. See id. at 3-10.
88. See id. at 6-10.  In Valensa, Brazil, the government attempted to modernize an estuary
fishery. See id. at 7.  This intervention led to the fishery’s eventual over-harvest and abandon-
ment. See id.  Government intervention into Nova Scotia’s Port Lameron Harbor also destabi-
lized the working order of a community-run fishery. See id. at 8.
89. See ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 130-
32.
ANDERSON_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:54 AM
1999] PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS: BOTTOM-UP OR TOP-DOWN? 89
the total allowable catch set by the government.90  Hence, a fisherman
does not need to rush out and fish, fearing that others will take any-
thing he leaves.  ITQs are nationally created, top-down property
rights that have vastly improved fishery productivity, reduced fishing
costs, and induced fishermen to invest in improving fish habitat.91  Es-
pecially in Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia, it appears that ITQs
are working.92  Moreover, because the rights are secure and valuable,
fishermen have an incentive to improve on enforcement mechanisms.
In New Zealand, for example, satellites are being used to monitor
boats fishing in the territory of the ITQs.93
Setting the quota, however, illustrates the potential for rent-
seeking behavior.94  Regulators establishing quota levels are suscepti-
ble to political pressures from the special interest groups they regu-
late, which may result in inefficiently large quota levels being
granted.95  Furthermore, if fishermen believe that ITQs will be dis-
tributed on the basis of historical catch, which is the usual allocation
mechanism, they have an incentive to increase their historic basis.
Using a long-term average that includes years prior to the announce-
ment of ITQs helps eliminate this type of race.96  Even after ITQs are
allocated, however, rent seeking may continue as it has in New Zea-
land.97  Seeing how valuable the quotas have become, the Maori—the
indigenous people of New Zealand—have petitioned the courts to in-
crease their share of ITQs, which can only happen if the total allow-
able catch is increased, thus reducing the benefit of the ITQ system,
or if other fishermen lose some of their quota.98
90. See id. at 130-31.
91. See id. at 131.
92. See, e.g., Michael de Alessi, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS (Inst. Econ. Aff., IEA Studies on
the Environment Series No. 11, 1998).
93. See id. at 51.
94. See ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 130-
32 (describing how ITQs motivate fishermen to employ more efficient fishing methods to in-
crease profitability and afford additional quotas).
95. See id. at 132.
96. Cf. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 172-73 (1997) (offering a similar solution—basing individual rights on use over
a longer period of time—to eliminate the “race to the pumphouse” associated with the initial
allocation of groundwater rights).
97. See ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 132.
98. See id.
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2.  Tar-Pamlico
In 1989, the first transacting water pollution control trading
community in North America formed in the Tar-Pamlico River Basin
of North Carolina.99  Problems with phosphorus and nitrogen dis-
charges had led to a series of fish kills, demonstrating that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) strict regulations for the point
source polluters in the basin were not working.100
Thanks to cooperation from the EPA, the state of North Caro-
lina was able to create an association of the point-source polluters,
which would face an EPA-established overall cap on pollution rather
than a firm-specific one.101  The important difference between the new
system and the old system is that polluters in the association have
pollution rights that are transferable among members.  Though entry
into the program is voluntary, the polluters only other option is to re-
turn to the expensive EPA firm-specific standards.102  Within the asso-
ciation, members are required to meet pollution levels in one of three
ways: they can lower their own emissions; they can purchase the right
to pollute more from other association members in return for those
members lowering their emissions; or they can pay a $56 fee per kilo-
gram of pollutant that funds abatement of non-point source pollution
such as agricultural runoff.103  In the case of the Tar-Pamlico River
Basin, the state of North Carolina and the EPA have created a top-
down property right to pollute that has greatly reduced the cost of
pollution abatement and improved water quality.
3.  RECLAIM
The South Coast Air Basin in California, which includes Los An-
geles, suffers some of the worst air pollution in the United States.104
In the 1990s, after the EPA had struggled and failed to bring the area
into attainment with state and federal air quality standards, a new
plan was tried.105  This plan, known as the Regional Clean Air Incen-
99. See David W. Riggs & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes and
River Basin Markets for Water Quality, in WATER MARKETING, supra note 62, at 147, 154.
100. See id.
101. Members’ nutrient discharge was to be no more than 425,000 kilograms per year by the
end of 1994.  See id.
102. See id. at 154-55.
103. See id. at 155.
104. See LATA GANGADHARAN, TRADABLE PERMITS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET IN LOS ANGELES 2 (Pol.
Econ. Res. Ctr., PERC Working Paper 96-3, 1996).
105. See id.
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tives Market (RECLAIM), set a cap on emissions of oxides of nitro-
gen (NOx) and sulfur (SOx) by the major stationary polluters and gave
tradable pollution permits to those firms.106  Like Tar-Pamlico,
RECLAIM created top-down property rights that allowed flexibility
in achieving standards and efficiency gains from transferability.
In establishing these top-down property rights to SOx and NOx
emissions, however, there are three problems.  First, it is difficult to
determine the proper level of emissions to set as the annual cap.  The
level changes as science and consensus about what level of pollution
is acceptable changes.  Second, the system does not work well if the
pollution rights are easily reduced without compensation, and as the
science gets better, there is likely to be pressure for the government
to lower the cap.  Third, as the government sets emission levels, sci-
ence may be subjugated to politics in setting the cap.107  Thus, rent-
seeking concerns arise again as they do with all top-down property
rights.
4.  CAMPFIRE
Wildlife management in southern Africa provides another exam-
ple of top-down property rights creation.108  In the former country of
Rhodesia, wildlife became the property of the Crown under colonial
rule.109  Rural communities that had been historically dependent on
the wild species lost their traditional rights to hunt and manage the
wildlife as they saw fit but retained the wildlife-associated costs.110
Wild animals destroyed crops, competed with the indigenous people’s
livestock for food and water, and, on occasion, were dangerous to
humans.111  Under such a system, it is no surprise that poachers ended
up as heroes to the local people and animal populations dwindled.112
106. These particular pollutants were chosen because the basin was not meeting the federal
standards regarding NOx and SOx, and the number of facilities emitting the pollutants were rela-
tively small, making it easier to monitor and regulate them. See id.
107. See generally William Aron et al., Flouting the Convention, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
1999, at 22 (discussing how science succumbed to politics in the managing of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling).
108. See Urs P. Kreuter & Randy T. Simmons, Who Owns the Elephants? The Politcial
Economy of Saving the African Elephant, in WILDLIFE IN THE MARKETPLACE 147, 160 (Terry
L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1995).
109. See, e.g., BRIAN CHILD ET AL., ZIMBABWE’S CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME: NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT BY THE PEOPLE 3 (IUCN-ROSA Environmental Issues Series No.
2, 1997).
110. See id.
111. See Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE), Sharing the Land: People and Elephants in Rural Zimbabwe (last modified Aug.
19, 1999) <http://www.campfire-zimbabwe.org/facts_07.html> [hereinafter CAMPFIRE, Sharing
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To reverse this trend, the new nation of Zimbabwe implemented
the Parks and Wildlife Act in 1975.113  The program gave private land-
owners the ability to manage wildlife on their land, including com-
mercial exploitation of the animals.114  As a result, benefits once more
accrued to the landowners and wildlife populations began to grow as
game ranchers restocked animals and conserved the ones already
there.115
Building on the success of this act, Zimbabwe established the
Communal Areas Management Plan for Indigenous Resources, or
CAMPFIRE.116  The CAMPFIRE program gave the same rights that
private landowners held on their property to District Councils with
respect to the communal property that makes up 42 percent of the
land in Zimbabwe.117  And today, the District Councils are trying to
devolve management even further to local wards and villages.118  The
success of this program, measured in terms of burgeoning wildlife
populations, is due to the fact that wildlife is now a profit-earning as-
set for the locals.  Income from sport hunting, tourism, exchange of
animals, and other CAMPFIRE programs has increased from
Z$743,699 in 1989 to Z$14,082,032 in 1995.119  Over that same period,
Zimbabwe’s elephant populations have increased by 14 percent, while
throughout most of Africa elephant populations have fallen by 24
percent.120  When a rural family of eight can expect to live on US$150
annually in Zimbabwe, the US$12,000 trophy fees paid by sport hunt-
the Land]:
[A]n elephant or two can quickly munch their way through a family’s crops, trampling
those that they do not consume, and destroying the family’s only source of subsistence
in the process. Elephants also threaten people’s lives—a local newspaper has reported
that over 100 people have been killed by elephants or buffaloes in Kariba since 1980.
Traditionally, therefore, rural Africans have had much to fear from elephants, and
have not had much incentive to manage them sustainably.
112. See CHILD ET AL., supra note 109, at 4.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 6.
116. See id. at 3, 9.
117. See Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE), What is CAMPFIRE? (last modified Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.campfire-
zimbabwe.org/more_01.html> (“Since 1975, Zimbabwe has allowed private property holders to
claim ownership of wildlife on their land and to benefit from its use.  Under CAMPFIRE, peo-
ple living on Zimbabwe’s impoverished communal lands, which represent 42% of the country,
claim the same right of proprietorship.”).
118. See CHILD ET AL., supra note 109, at 9.
119. See id. at 14.
120. See Wayne M. Getz et al., Sustaining Natural and Human Capital: Villagers and Scien-
tists, 283 SCI. 1855, 1855 (1999).
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ers for an elephant get locals thinking about whether they would
rather raise cattle or elephants.121  Not surprisingly, anti-poaching
units were one of the first things funded by local communities with
the funding received through CAMPFIRE.122
Under CAMPFIRE and the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act, Zim-
babwe removed its governmental control and bestowed property
rights on landowners, both individual and communal.  While the top-
down designation came from the central government, the actual en-
forcement has largely been bottom-up with local communities moni-
toring access and poaching.  The CAMPFIRE program simply re-
moved the governmental barrier imposed by colonial rule that
restricted private property rights to wild animals.  Hence, in the case
of CAMPFIRE, top-down action removed governmental restrictions
on property rights thereby allowing bottom-up rights to work.
V.  PROBLEMS WITH TOP-DOWN PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACHES
TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS
There can be no doubt that some environmental resources cross
international boundaries.  Wild animals, like the elephants in the
CAMPFIRE program or fish in New Zealand ITQs, do not recognize
political boundaries, nor does air or water.  When migration across
borders creates competing uses between international parties for the
resources, bottom-up solutions become more problematic.
Whether Trail Smelter-type solutions are available depends on
the ability of parties to identify harms, establish specific cause and ef-
fect relationships, and resolve conflicts through adjudication.  As was
shown in Trail Smelter,123 international agreement can allow adjudica-
tion procedures to recognize property rights and resolve conflicting
resource uses.  Agreements may be required to establish the neces-
sary adjudicatory institutions that would allow property rights to
evolve bottom-up through common law.
121. See CAMPFIRE, Sharing the Land, supra note 111:
With a trophy fee of up to US$12,000 or more, together with a daily hunting fee of
$1,000, one elephant can realise [sic] $33,000 over the course of an average 21-day
hunt . . . .  As a rural family of eight would expect to subsist on about $150 per year in
Zimbabwe, this is no small amount.
122. See Kreuter & Simmons, supra note 108, at 150; Communal Areas Management Pro-
gramme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), HUNTING: Funding Rural Development &
Wildlife Conservation in CAMPFIRE (last modified Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.campfire-
zimbabwe.org/facts_12.html>.
123. See discussion supra Part IV.
ANDERSON_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:54 AM
94 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:73
With cases such as global warming and ozone depletion, how-
ever, Trail Smelter-type adjudication may be difficult.  For example,
proving harm from global warming may be difficult, because, at pres-
ent, science is inadequate124 to provide conclusive evidence regarding
whether global warming is even occurring125 and, if it is, to provide the
cause126 of and possible harm127 caused by global warming.
Yet, even if these issues are resolved, the transaction costs to
identify each and every party harmed and causing harm would be
prohibitive.  Nearly every production process on the planet uses some
form of carbon-based energy, and according to global warming pro-
ponents nearly everyone would suffer some harm from global warm-
ing.  Who then is to bring suit and who is to be blamed?  Can every-
one sue everyone?  Specifically, how do we know that a particular
coal plant is causing your beachfront property to be gobbled up by
the sea?
If property rights solutions are to prevail for the global atmos-
pheric and oceanic commons, some top-down establishment seems
inevitable.  For example, fish quotas or tradable CO2 permits could be
established by treaty.  But making such top-down international prop-
124. See ANDERSON & LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14, at 159-
61.
125. See Roy W. Spencer & John R. Christy, Precise Monitoring of Global Temperature
Trends from Satellites, 247 SCI. 1558, 1562 (1990) (finding no indication of atmospheric warming
in satellite data from 1979 to 1988).  But cf. Frank J. Wentz & Matthias Schabel, Effects of Or-
bital Decay on Satellite-Derived Lower-Tropospheric Temperature Trends, 394 NATURE 661,
661-64 (1998) (countering that Spencer and Christy did not account for orbital drift in their
data).  On the NASA website, Spencer acknowledges Wentz and Schabel are correct in their
criticism, but, factoring the new information on orbital drift in with other corrections for east-
west drift, he and Dr. Christy still find no warming in the satellite data. See Roy Spencer, Meas-
uring the Temperature of Earth From Space: Even with Needed Corrections, Data Still Don’t
Show the Expected Signature of Global Warming (last modified Aug. 13, 1999) <http://www.
ghcc.msfc.nasa.gov/MSU/hl_measuretemp.htm>.
126. See Robert C. Balling, Jr., Global Warming: Messy Models, Decent Data, and Pointless
Policy, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 83, 95 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995) (arguing that over
75 percent of the observed global warming in this century can be explained by variations in the
length of the solar sunspot cycle) (citing E. Friis-Christensen & K. Lassen, Length of the Solar
Cycle: An Indicator of Solar Activity Closely Associated with Climate, 254 SCI. 698 (1991)).  See
also E.N. Parker, Sunny Side of Global Warming, 399 NATURE 416, 416-17 (1999).
127. One person’s loss of beachfront property is most likely another’s gain. See Daniel K.
Benjamin, Tangents, PERC REPORTS (Pol. Econ. Res. Ctr., Bozeman, Mont.), Mar. 1999, at 14,
14-15 (citing Brent Sohngen and Robert Mendelsohn, Valuing the Impact of Large-Scale Eco-
logical Change in a Market: The Effect of Climate Change on U.S. Lumber, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
686, 704 (1998) (showing a net benefit from global warming for the U.S. timber industry)).  For
further discussion of warming benefits, see THOMAS GALE MOORE, CLIMATE OF FEAR: WHY
WE SHOULDN’T WORRY ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING (1998).  For further discussion of global
warming, see Balling, Jr., supra note 126.
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erty rights work, as they do in the national cases cited above, has con-
siderable problems.
A.  Rent Seeking at the International Level
Rent seeking is likely to occur at the international level.  The
process of assigning property rights has definite distributional conse-
quences because property rights represent claims on rents.128  There-
fore, political creation of property rights attracts rent-seeking efforts
to influence their distribution that can be costly in themselves.129  As
top-down rights move from the national to the international level, the
number of individuals and groups with something to gain or lose from
the property rights allocation process increases, thus increasing the
opportunity for rent seeking.
Jonathan Baert Wiener counters that rent seeking is less likely to
occur at the international level, because international treaties are en-
acted through a voluntary assent-voting rule, unlike the coercive ma-
jority rule of national law.130  Presumably, no nation will sign an
agreement unless it is made better off, and under voluntary assent, no
nation is bound by an agreement unless it signs.131  Thus, rent seeking
by countries would seem impossible or, at least, less likely.132  Wiener
admits, however, that rent seeking will occur in the process of ham-
mering out the details of international agreements and through repu-
tational pressure.133  Moreover, dividing up the gains and losses at the
national level still opens the door for rent seeking in the treaty ratifi-
cation process.
Wiener’s arguments notwithstanding, Yandle studied rent-
seeking efforts in the Kyoto global warming negotiations.134  In his
128. See Anderson & Hill, Privatizing the Commons, supra note 32, at 439.
129. See id. at 440-41.
130. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regu-
lation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 769-71 (1999):
In principle, the voluntary assent rule at the global level means that . . . coercive redis-
tribution cannot occur.  No country will adopt a treaty that does not yield net gains for
the country.  International agreements, unlike majoritarian legislation, are analogous
to voluntary multiparty contracts in which every contracting party must benefit to se-
cure its participation.
131. See id. at 769.
132. See id. at 771.
133. See id. at 773 (“[A]t the international level, the intended victims of a purely rent-
seeking stratagem could always exercise their right to withhold their voluntary assent to the
regulatory treaty.  The real impact of rent-seeking is in the design of the detailed content of
global regulatory treaties . . . .”).
134. See YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, supra note 66, at 7-21.
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“Bootleggers and Baptists” analysis, Yandle notes that natural gas
producers, such as Enron, as well as oil companies and ethanol pro-
ducers, trumpeted the need for global carbon emissions standards.135
They supported the Kyoto Accord because it severely restricts the use
of coal, their biggest competitor.136
These companies were not the only ones rent seeking in Kyoto;
nations were involved as well.137  Specifically, Yandle cites two poli-
cies from Kyoto that resulted from the United States and the Euro-
pean Union (EU) fighting for better economic position relative to
one another.138  The EU wanted to raise its rivals’ costs by opposing
emissions trading, fearing the United States could avoid significant
costs by simply buying sufficient tradable greenhouse emission per-
mits.139  Yandle quotes British Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott
who wanted to close this door on the United States: “Europe has al-
ways been clear that while we accept the trading possibilities in this
matter, they should not be used as a reason for avoiding taking action
in [one’s] own country.”140
The United States saw its opportunity to raise its rival’s costs by
not allowing European emissions to be treated as a bubble and not
allowing trading within the EU.141  Clearly such trading would lower
the costs of compliance with Kyoto, but the United States opposed
the bubble concept for Europe and argued that each European nation
should have to reach reductions on its own.142
Therefore, while there may be theoretical reasons that rent
seeking will be less likely to occur at the international level, the les-
sons from Kyoto indicate that rent seeking does and will occur in the
formation of international environmental agreements.  As the num-
ber of parties affected by an agreement increase when there is a move
from the national to international level, the opportunity for rent
seeking increases as well.
135. See id. at 8-9.
136. See id. at 3, 8-13, 18; Yandle, Grasping for the Heavens, supra note 14, at 39 (“[Under
Kyoto, c]oal is predicted to suffer the largest loss of market share, while natural gas becomes the
fuel of choice.”).
137. See YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS, supra note 66, at 12-13, 18-21.
138. See id. at 19-21.
139. See id. at 18-19.
140. Id. at 19.
141. See id. at 20.
142. See id.
ANDERSON_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:54 AM
1999] PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS: BOTTOM-UP OR TOP-DOWN? 97
B.  Sovereignty and Top-Down Property Rights
Even if rent seeking can be avoided in establishing such top-
down property rights, Jeremy Rabkin puts forth three possible con-
cerns of increased international environmental regulation.143  First,
greater international environmental regulation implies a new under-
standing of international affairs where national sovereignty is weak-
ened and international institutions find increased authority.144  Coer-
cion is ultimately necessary for compliance; for this reason, issues of
sovereignty get messy.  International coercion means that one sover-
eign nation or group of nations must limit the sovereignty of another.
If doing so means inflicting punishments through military action, it is
possible that the repercussions of enforcing international environ-
mental regulation are worse than doing nothing.
Perhaps it is possible to enforce international environmental
agreements without the use of military force.  Voluntary compliance
is certainly a possibility if nations see compliance in their interest.145
Furthermore, the possibility of trade sanctions may be sufficient to
keep countries from reneging on international treaties.146  Shared tra-
ditions and repeat dealings between countries may also to be able to
ensure compliance with international environmental agreements.
Surely the peaceful, long-term relations between the United States
and Canada played a role in their willingness to enforce the results of
arbitration in the Trail Smelter case.147  But is the international picture
likely to be so rosy?
What if signatories to international agreements simply defect, ig-
noring fishing quotas or emission permits?  If top-down property
rights are to be effective, this cannot be allowed.  The Tar-Pamlico
solution148 would be ineffective if the parties to the agreement were
not monitored and forced to comply by EPA.  Therefore, similar en-
forcement would be necessary of countries engaged in an interna-
tional agreement.  Enforcement measures and the use of international
coercion are thus required for top-down property rights solutions.
143. See Jeremy Rabkin, The Value of Sovereignty and the Costs of Global Environmental-
ism, in GREENING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1, 1-2, on file with
authors).
144. See id. (manuscript at 1).
145. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 743-44 (1999).
146. For a succinct discussion of trade sanctions and their drawbacks, see id. at 757-60.
147. See discussion supra Part IV.
148. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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Second, Rabkin claims that international environmental regula-
tion implies a change in our constitutional system by moving away
from the checks and balances of a federalist system.149  This raises
concerns about reduced accountability of rule-makers to the citizens
of sovereign nations on whom limits are imposed.  John Cohrssen ar-
gues that “loss of sovereignty means a lack of accountability to
American citizens for actions taken by . . . international organiza-
tion[s] and the US government.”150  He contends that there are cases
where U.S. officials and representatives of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) encourage international organizations to get involved
in an issue and to call for international regulations.151  The U.S. offi-
cials and other beneficiaries in the United States can then rely on the
international organization’s position as a reason for U.S. government
actions that redistribute rents, as in the case of climate change pol-
icy.152
Third, Rabkin worries that international environmental regula-
tion will increase the risk of international tension, reduce free trade,
and undermine the confidence and trust of United States citizens in
their government.153  Enforcing international environmental agree-
ments causes a loss of focus in foreign policy.154  Tactics of retribution
for violating foreign policy are weakened as more policies needing en-
forcement are added to the list of government foreign policy func-
tions.  Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free
trade to arms trading to human rights.  Each new issue in the bag
weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating
conflicts between issues.155  As Brett Schaefer writes,
Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important
that the U.S. focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount
149. See Rabkin, supra note 143 (manuscript at 2).
150. John Cohrssen, Esq., The World Through Emerald Colored Glasses, in GREENING U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 6 (manuscript at 63, 64, on file with authors).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Rabkin, supra note 143 (manuscript at 2).
154. See id. (manuscript at 26).
155. For example, an appeals panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on October
12, 1998, ruled against a United States law protecting sea turtles because it posed a barrier to
trade. The law required that shrimp imported to the United States be caught using nets
equipped with special devices which allow trapped sea turtles to escape.  The WTO ruled the
law did not give the complaining countries sufficient time to implement the devices and did not
negotiate with them to find other ways to meet the law’s objectives.  See Anne Swardson, Turtle-
Protection Law Overturned by WTO; Environmentalists Angered by Decision, WASH. POST,
Oct. 13, 1998, at C-2.
ANDERSON_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  8:54 AM
1999] PROPERTY RIGHTS SOLUTIONS: BOTTOM-UP OR TOP-DOWN? 99
importance to the nation.  Traditionally, these priorities have been
opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting
our allies, securing vital resources, ensuring access to foreign
economies, and the like.156
If we choose to punish China for not complying with a global warm-
ing agreement, what form of punishment do we then use if China
threatens Taiwan or sells ballistic missiles to renegade countries?157  A
choice must be made and more focus on one will lessen the focus on
the other.158
To Rabkin’s list, add the problem of monitoring international
agreements.  In order for an agreement to be enforced, there must be
monitoring to deter cheaters and noncompliance.  Gary Becker notes
that monitoring incurs costs.159  Catching noncompliant entities will be
costly if not impossible as witnessed by the problems with other in-
ternational agreements, such as enforcement of the ban on ivory
trading contained in the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).160  Detecting
whether a country is cheating on its emission rights will surely be dif-
ficult unless an international police force can monitor compliance
within countries, something most countries are not likely to con-
done.161  Finally, even with an international police force, the data re-
quired to detect noncompliance may not be accurate simply because
monitoring technology is poor or those keeping records have an in-
centive to cheat.  Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor conclude from
156. Brett D. Schaefer, Green Creep: The Increasing Influence of Environmentalism in U.S.
Foreign Policy, in GREENING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 6 (manuscript at 161, 164, on
file with authors).
157. See Rabkin, supra note 143 (manuscript at 26).
158. See id.
159. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 206 (1968):
If violations could be eliminated without cost, the optimal solution would obviously be
to eliminate all of them and to engage in pure monopoly pricing.  In general, however,
as with other kinds of offenses, there are two costs of eliminating violations.  There is
first of all the cost of discovering violations and of “apprehending” violators.  This cost
is greater the greater the desired probability of detection and the greater the number
of violations.
160. See Kreuter & Simmons, supra note 108, at 156-60.
161. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 190-91 (1995) (discussing
the intrusiveness associated with the monitoring of environmental regulation).
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their sampling of international agreements that “national data often
are not comparable, and their accuracy is often low or unknown.”162
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS
Property rights do provide a viable way of solving some of the
problems of the global commons.  They can evolve bottom-up under
international law; however, where transaction costs preclude this pro-
cess, property rights can be created top-down.
To encourage property rights solutions to environmental prob-
lems, U.S. foreign policy and international agreements should lower
transaction costs related to the definition, enforcement, and transfer
of property rights in two ways.  First, foreign policy should support
sovereign states that respect and enforce property rights and the rule
of law.  In this way, the probability of fostering bottom-up solutions
will be increased.
Second, where top-down property rights are created, those rights
should be clearly assigned to specific individuals or groups and should
be enforced through a judicial system that arbitrates disputes across
borders.  Treaties between nations that could lessen the costs and
time constraints of adjudication, such as those encountered in the
Trail Smelter decision, could encourage international bottom-up
property rights.
Because international environmental treaties have significant
implications for the sovereignty and accountability of governments,
they should be confined to those issues that cannot be solved through
local property rights and domestic policies.  Chief Justice of the
United States Charles Hughes recognized in 1929 that “the treaty-
making power is intended for the purpose of having treaties made
relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the
United States in their internal concerns.”163  If an environmental
problem can be handled internally, there is no need for international
regulations that encourage rent seeking, encroach on sovereign pow-
ers, and discourage democratic accountability.
Where competition for resources can create a tragedy of the
global commons, the top-down creation of property rights may be
162. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 659, 680 (1998).
163. Rabkin, supra note 143 (manuscript at 15) (citing Charles Evans Hughes, Remarks to
the American Society of International Law, Seventh Session, 23 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 176,
194 (1929)).
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necessary.  Tradable pollution permits and fishery ITQs provide ex-
amples of top-down property rights that have worked within national
borders and could work in the international context.  But before en-
tering into treaties developing such property rights, citizens and treaty
negotiators should be aware that these property rights will have to be
enforced and that such enforcement will interfere with the sovereign
powers of the countries involved.  Because enforcement is costly, such
treaties may undermine the rule of law that, ultimately, is the only
hope for resolving competition over resource use.
Where competition for resource use crosses political boundaries
and thus creates a global commons, foreign policy still can encourage
property rights solutions by adhering to the following four guide-
lines:164
1. Foreign policy should flow logically from a body of evolved,
private law and should protect property rights.
2. If an agreement concerns a resource that has become the
subject of national or local regulation and that has transjurisdic-
tional effects, it might be desirable to create inter- or multi-
jurisdictional rules governing ownership.
3. Signatory status should be restricted to those nations that
have direct interests in the resources under threat.
4.  Decisions relating to the validity of scientific claims should
be subject to the balancing procedure of civil law, and decision-
makers should bring to those decisions a healthy skepticism of
claims that purport to represent a scientific consensus.
The tragedy of the commons, whether within one nation or be-
tween many, results from competition among resource users in a
world where resources are scarce and access is uncontrolled.  In order
to prevent the tragedy, access must be limited either through the es-
tablishment of property rights or regulation by government.  In many
cases, the tragedy of the commons is avoided because people directly
involved in competition for the resource benefit from developing
property rights themselves.  This evolutionary process is not without
costs, but it can be encouraged by a rule of law, including adjudica-
tory institutions to facilitate the definition and enforcement of such
rights.  Fostering an international rule of law offers the best hope for
preventing the tragedy of the global commons.  Where transaction
costs are prohibitive, top-down property rights provide a second-best
solution if rent seeking can be kept to a minimum.
164. See Morris, supra note 68 (manuscript at 32).
